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The Role of Patents in the International Framework of Clean Technology
Transfer: A Discussion of Barriers and Solutions
by Mark Consilvio
I.

Introduction

Alarming average temperature increases of
the Earth’s surface and oceans have prompted global
action to curtail the human population’s impact on
climate change.1 Increases in global temperatures
will significantly impact water resources, food
security, coastal regions, biological ecosystems, and
human health.2 Climate fluctuations will likely
increase the frequency and intensity of extreme
weather phenomenon such as severe storms, floods,
and droughts.3 Weather and regional temperature
changes could harm agricultural land and ecosystems,
spread disease, and irreparably damage health and
food security in many regions throughout the world.4
Predictions also foretell of irreversible ice cap melting,
the sea level rising, and mass flooding of coastal regions
– displacing portions of the human population.5
Strong scientific evidence has determined
that human production of “greenhouse gases” are the
primary culprit in trapping heat, leading to global
warming over the last half century.6 Greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere like carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O) absorb, scatter, and
emit energy that would otherwise be radiated into
space, resulting in a net warming of the Earth.7 The
large quantities of greenhouse gases emitted during
human energy production, e.g., by burning coal or oil,
have exacerbated this phenomenon beyond its natural
1. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[IPCC] Plenary XXVII, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis
Report (November 2007) [hereinafter IPCC Plenary XXVII].
2. See id. at 51.
3. See id. at 53.
4. See id. at 48-53. “Sea level rise is expected to exacerbate
inundation, storm surge, erosion and other coastal hazards, thus
threatening vital infrastructure, settlements and facilities that
support the livelihood of island communities.” Id. at 52. “Increased
risk of extreme high sea level” is predicted to be likely causing and
“potential for movement of populations and infrastructure” and
“migration-related health effects.” Id. at 53.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 39.
7. See id. at 36-37 (“The atmospheric concentrations of
CO2 and CH4 in 2005 exceed by far the natural range over the
last 650,000 years. Global increases in CO2 concentrations are
due primarily to fossil fuel use, with land-use change providing
another significant but smaller contribution. It is very likely that the
observed increase in CH4 concentration is predominantly due to
agriculture and fossil fuel use. The increase in N2O concentration is
primarily due to agriculture.”).

degree, despite being a normal and partially necessary
process to keep the Earth habitable.8 Anthropogenic
warming over the last three decades has likely had
a global influence on many physical and biological
systems.9 In response, scientists and engineers have
developed “clean” technologies to significantly decrease
greenhouse gas emissions. Clean technologies are
designed to mitigate climate change with solutions
ranging from carbon capture and energy-efficient
devices to renewable energy sources and hybrid
technologies.
In addition to environmental concerns,
the world’s governments have recognized that its
current modus operandi of energy production is not
sustainable.10 The world’s energy production, largely
based on fossil fuels, will inevitably come to an end
as the supply of those fuels dwindles. Spawned by
the gas shortage of the 1970s and reinforced by the
oil price spikes of the past decade, concerns over
our dependence on fossil fuels has driven scientists,
economists, and politicians to call for a transition to
sustainable forms of energy production.11 Sustainable
or “renewable” energy sources include mainly solar,
wind, hydro/marine, geothermal, and biomass.
Renewable energy technologies are designed to harness
and convert these naturally occurring forms of energy
into electricity and other usable forms of power. These
clean technologies have the benefit of being based on
virtually limitless resources while significantly reducing
environmental impact with minimal production of
greenhouse gases. In addition to renewable energy
technologies, adaptation and mitigation technologies
can help minimize the impact from greenhouse gases
generated by traditional forms of energy generation.
Though mitigation and adaptation technologies
are unable to prevent all climate change, they can
substantially reduce the rate and magnitude of such
8. Id.
9. Id. at 41.
10. See generally Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007) (intending
to increase the production of clean renewable fuels, to increase
the efficiency, to promote research on and deploy greenhouse gas
capture); Council Directive 2009/28, 2009 O.J. (L140) (EC)
(promoting of the use of energy from renewable sources in the
European Union).
11. Id.; See also Daniel Kammen, Renewable Energy in U.S.
Foreign Policy, 36 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 327 (2006).
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change.12 All of these clean technology solutions are
an essential component in combating climate change.13
Despite these advances and given current climate
change mitigation policies and sustainable development
practices, global greenhouse gas emissions will continue
to grow over the next few decades.14
First, this paper will address the current
intergovernmental legal framework relating to climate
change and the international transfer of climate change
mitigation and adaptation technologies.15 Second, the
paper will discuss some of the perceived barriers and
possible solutions surrounding international technology
transfer. Finally, the paper suggests an optimal solution
based on the current international framework and
evidence of technology transfer barriers. A goal of this
paper is to show that the global intellectual property
regime should be part of a solution and not a barrier to
international technology transfer.
II. United Nation Framework Convention on
Climate Change
The 1992 United Nation Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)16 came
into force in 1994 as a global initiative to stabilize
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere.17 The
UNFCCC has been ratified by countries representing
almost all global producers of greenhouse gas
emissions.18 The stated objectives of the UNFCCC
include: allowing the ecosystem to adapt, ensuring
food production, and creating sustainable economic
development.19 The UNFCCC states that developed
countries should bear the primary financial burden in
12. Id.at 65.
13. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development [ICTSD], Climate Change, Technology
Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights: Background
Paper 1 (August 2008) [hereinafter ICTSD Background Paper].
14. IPCC Plenary XXVII, supra note 1, at 44.
15. This transfer of clean technologies is traditionally
viewed from the perspective of developed nations – whereby
developed nations are seen as inventors of clean technologies and
developing nations are seen as needing those inventions as their
energy production increases. Some evidence presented in this
paper contradicts this paradigm – particularly regarding emerging
economies.
16. The leading international treaty establishing a Secretariat
to consider what can be done to reduce global warming and to cope
with whatever temperature increases are inevitable.
17. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
Art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
18. See Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, UNFCCC, http://
ghg.unfccc.int/index.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2011) (containing
data estimating the levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
for members to the TRIPS Agreement); K.Ravi Srinivas, Climate
Change, Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Rights 30,
Research and Information System for Developing Countries (2009).
19. Id.
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achieving these objectives.20
The developed country Parties and
other developed Parties … shall take
all practicable steps to promote,
facilitate and finance, as appropriate,
the transfer of, or access to,
environmentally sound technologies
and know-how to other Parties,
particularly developing country
Parties, to enable them to implement
the provisions of the Convention.21
The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
describes the “transfer of technology” as the
communication of “systematic knowledge for the
manufacture of a product, for the application of
a process or for the rendering of a service,” which
“does not extend to the transactions involving the
mere sale or mere lease of goods.”22 The knowledge
should include all of the “entrepreneurial expertise and
professional know-how” needed to commercialize the
technology.23
The third annual Conference of Parties
(COP) of the UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol
which, inter alia, set emission limits for the parties.24
Subsequent to agreement on the Kyoto Protocol, the
patent world saw a dramatic rise in the patenting of
clean technologies.25 This reaction suggests that further
restrictions on carbon emissions would alter the clean
technology landscape by increasing the demand for
clean technologies, thereby driving innovation through
the patent system.
In addition to emissions reduction goals,
the UNFCCC has spawned a variety of technology
transfer mechanisms. The Kyoto Protocol introduced
20. UNFCCC, supra note 17, at Art. 3.1, 4.3.
21. UNFCCC, supra note 17, at Art. 4.5.
22. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
[UNCTAD], UNCTAD Series on Issues in International
Investment Agreements 5-6 (2001), available at http://www.
unctad.org/en/docs//psiteiitd28.en.pdf.
23. See id. (importing and reselling of a good in a particular
country is not alone sufficient to constitute actual transfer of
technology because it involves only the good and not the knowledge
to create it.).
24. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change , Conference of the Parties, 3d
Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1997)
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; See United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties,
Fifteenth Session, Dec. 7-19, 2009, Copenhagen, Den. U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter COP-15].
25. U.N. Environment Programme, European Patent
Office [EPO], and ICTSD, Patents and clean energy:
bridging the gap between evidence and policy: Final report,
8 (2010) [hereinafter EPO report].
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emissions trading, establishing a “carbon market” based
on emission reduction units (ERUs).26 In addition
to trading ERUs, a clean development mechanism
and joint implementation plan enables countries
to meet their emissions reduction targets, stimulate
sustainable development, and encourage contributions
from developing countries and the private sector.27
But developing countries view these mechanisms as
inadequate to fulfill the UNFCCC commitments of
developed nations.28
The Kyoto Protocol is set to expire in 2012
and efforts to continue or expand its emission
restrictions have largely failed.29 A deadline to settle
on a new emissions framework was set for the fifteenth
COP session in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009,
but negotiations did not produce an agreement.30
The Copenhagen Accord did establish a Technology
Mechanism “to accelerate technology development
and transfer in support of action on adaptation and
mitigation that will be guided by a country-driven
approach and be based on national circumstances
and priorities.”31 Many aspects of the Technology
Mechanism are still unsettled, but countries might
be more likely to agree on clean technology transfer
mechanisms than on quantitative emissions reductions
that might stimulate clean technology transfer.
III. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement) created
minimum standards and a moderate amount of
harmonization for intellectual property (IP) laws across
the globe.32 The treaty ensures that the intellectual
26. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 24; The Mechanisms under the
Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism
and Joint Implementation, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_
protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2011)
(detailing each mechanism). See Anita M. Halvorssen, International
Law And Sustainable Development -- Tools For Addressing Climate
Change, 39 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 397, 416 (2011).
27. Id.
28. EPO report, supra note 25, at 19; Srinivas, supra note 18,
at 1.
29. COP-15, supra note 24; Daniel Bodansky, The
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 104 Am. J.
Int’l L. 230, 230 (2010). The Copenhagen Accord being only a
political statement is devoid of legal force to replace or extend the
Kyoto Protocol.
30. Bodansky, supra note 29.
31. COP-15, supra note 24.
32. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) available

property rights (IPRs) of each member state do not
favor one nation over another or favor a nation’s own
citizens over foreign inventors.33 These requirements
promote facial neutrality of IP laws, but may not
address the inherent imbalance of IP power between
developed and developing nations.34 This imbalance
may be difficult to reconcile with the objectives and
principles of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 7 of the
TRIPS Agreement states that IPRs “should contribute
… to the transfer and dissemination of technology” and
Article 8 recommends “[a]ppropriate measures . . . to
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right
holders or the resort to practices which . . . adversely
affect the international transfer of technology.”35 In
particular, Article 66.2 requires developed countries
to provide incentives to their local enterprises and
institutions to promote and encourage technology
transfer to the least-developed countries (LDCs).36
However, the degree of success of any technology
transfer under the TRIPS Agreement is still unclear,
and concerns are growing that mechanisms designed
to encourage technology transfers to LDCs have been
ineffective.37
Despite the specific provisions on technology
transfer, the heart of the TRIPS Agreement is the
protection of IPRs.38 The underlying policy is based on
the perspective that IPRs are fully protected as private
commercial property and technology transfer is best
achieved through competitive market conditions.39
Thus, the treaty actually signifies a shift from
emphasizing regulation of technology transfers in the
interest of the developing country towards a more open
market-based model. An open market-based model
encourages technology transfer to developing countries
through the operation of the free market, coupled with
assistance and cooperation on the part of developed
countries.40
IV. Intellectual Property Divide
How IPRs function in the technology transfer
process has become increasingly important.41 IPRs
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
33. Id. at arts. 3, 4.
34. Cynthia Cannady, Issue Paper No. 25: Access to Climate
Change Technology by Developing Countries, ICTSD Programme on
IPRs and Sustainable Development (2009).
35. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at arts. 7, 8.2.
36. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 66.2.
37. ICTSD Background Paper, supra note 13, at 3.
38. UNCTAD Series on Issues in International
Investment Agreements, supra note 22, at 63.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 63-64.
41. EPO report, supra note 25, at 19.
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are not expressly mentioned in the UNFCCC or the
Kyoto Protocol, but prior to the UNFCCC COP-13
session held in Bali, several developing countries like
Cuba, India, Indonesia, Tanzania, and China stressed
the need to address the role of IP in the climate change
discussion.42 The subsequent Bali Action Plan suggests
consideration of:
Effective mechanisms and enhanced
means for the removal of obstacles
to, and provision of financial and
other incentives for, scaling up of the
development and transfer of technology
to developing country Parties in
order to promote access to affordable
environmentally sound technologies.43
The UNFCCC parties disagree on whether IPRs are an
obstacle that impede effective technology transfer and
if so, what measures should be taken.44 Developing
countries, like China, have argued that patents are
an obstacle to clean technology transfer because
patents limit a country’s access to clean technologies.45
Conversely, the United States has expressly opposed
any weakening of IPRs related to clean technologies.46
The divide over IPRs has delayed agreement among
UNFCCC parties concerning clean technology
transfer.47
V. Patents and Technology Transfer
All IPRs, particularly patent rights, do not have
equal potential to inhibit technology transfer across
all developing nations.48 Research by Copenhagen
Economics suggests that patent filings in clean
technology sectors are almost nonexistent in the least
developed countries.49 The research data showed that
only 0.1 percent of the 215,000 patent applications
for certain clean technologies were filed in LDCs.50 If
a particular technology is not patented in a particular
42. ICTSD Background Paper, supra note 13, at 4.
43. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Conference of the Parties, Thirteenth Session, Dec. 3-15,
2007; COP-13 in Bali, Indon. U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/
Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008).
44. ICTSD Background Paper, supra note 13, at 2.
45. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Addressing the Green Patent
Global Deadlock through Bayh-Dole Reform, 119 Yale L.J. 1727,
1727 (2010).
46. Id. at 1728.
47. Id.
48. Copenhagen Econ. A/S & the IPR Co. ApS, Are IPR
a Barrier to the Transfer of Climate Change Technology? (2009)
(amassing research from several independent sources) [hereinafter
Copenhagen Economics].
49. Id.
50. EPO report, supra note 25, at 22.
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country, anyone in that country can use the disclosed
technology for its benefit. Therefore, patents are
unlikely to be a barrier in LDCs.
However, countries with emerging economies
have significant numbers of patents in clean technology
sectors. One study showed that China ranked second
among leading innovators in climate-friendly cement
and geothermal energy.51 The Republic of Korea
ranked second for patents in energy-efficient lighting
and Russia ranked third for patents in carbon-capture
and storage, climate-friendly cement, and geothermal
energy.52 Other studies mentioned in a joint report by
the European Patent Office, the U.N. Environment
Programme, and the International Centre for Trade
and Sustainable Development, have provided similar
evidence that patents are important in many emerging
economies and should be considered in the clean
technology transfer debate as a possible barrier.53 But
the existence of significant quantities of patents in
emerging economies does not resolve the issue of
whether patents are a barrier to clean technology
transfer.
Technical information is costly to learn
and absorb for endogenous commercialization.54
Technology owners with IPRs may theoretically
demand prices that are higher than marginal cost or
may monopolize markets.55 The high concentration of
equivalent clean technologies found in a small number
of companies56 increases the risk of anti-competitive
behavior.57 Anti-competitive practices are always a
danger in intellectual property regimes and threaten
to inhibit innovation in any market – developed
or developing. Some corporations could engage in
patent “blocking,” a strategy whereby patent owners
deter competitors from entering the market because
of the costs associated with trying to invent in the
neighborhood of patents.58 However, the fungible
nature of energy production and maturity of many
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 22-23; Srinivas, supra note 18.
54. Keith E. Maskus, Issue Paper No. 7: Encouraging
International Technology Transfer, in UNCTAD -ICTSD Project
on IPRs and Sustainable Development § 2.2(a) (2004).
55. Id. at § 2.2(c).
56. EPO report, supra note 25, at 64.
57. Frederick M. Abbott, Issue Paper No. 24: Innovation
and Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change: Lessons from
the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public Health,
Intellectual Property and Sustainable Development Series,
ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development §
3 (2009).
58. Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible
Hand: How Intellectual Property Rights May Impede Innovation in
Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech.
381, 419-20.
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clean technologies decrease the likelihood of a single
blocking patent.59 Even in the biofuel sector, where
avoiding patented microorganisms may be difficult,
licensing of those patents is likely and royalties would
not remain high for long.60 Other factors, such as lack
of capital and know-how, may be larger impediments to
technology transfer.61
VI. The Search for Balance
Though true technology transfer is not
necessarily based on IPRs, IPRs have the potential to
make technology transfer too costly and impractical
with almost any innovation. Most developing
countries remain net consumers rather than donors
of technology.62 Developing countries have a strong
interest in expanding their access to international
technologies.63 But not all developing countries have
the same ability to learn from foreign technologies
and absorb them into their domestic economy.64
Emerging economies like China and Brazil have
good investment potential and are likely to continue
to gain technology through transfer to endogenous
companies.65 LDCs, on the other hand, may find little
foreign direct investment without improvements to skill
levels, infrastructure, IP protection/enforcement, and
increases in funding for transfers.66 At the international
level, discussions to weaken IPRs have been recently
proposed. During the UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action session in
June of 2009, parties included provisions specifically
addressing IPRs in the negotiating text: compulsory
licensing for patented environmentally-sound
technologies, mandatory exclusions from patenting
for climate-friendly technologies held by developed
countries, pooling and sharing of publicly funded
technologies, and making the technologies available
in the public domain at an affordable price or royaltyfree.67 None of these provisions were ultimately
59. Abbott, supra note 57, at § 3.
60. John H. Barton, Issue Paper No. 2: Intellectual Property
and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries: An
Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind Technologies, ICTSD
Programme on Trade and Environment (2007).
61. See Marilyn Brown et al., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Carbon
Lock-In: Barriers To Deploying Climate change Mitigation Technologies
(2007) (discussing barriers for U.S. companies) [hereinafter Carbon
Lock-In].
62. UNCTAD Series on Issues in International
Investment Agreements, supra note 22, at 7.
63. Maskus, supra note 54.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Whether this deficiency is real or just perceived in all
sectors remains unclear and warrants further study. See, e.g., Carbon
Lock-in, supra note 61.
67. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad

adopted, but they are an insight into the current
discussion of IPRs in the climate change context.
VII. Exclusions from Patentability
Patenting exclusions for clean technologies
may be the most unlikely proposal to be adopted
of all the ad hoc working group’s proposals leading
up to the COP-15 in Copenhagen. The provision
allows countries to exclude applications for clean
technology from patents and rescind patented clean
technologies from patent protection.68 This rather
extreme solution seems to directly conflict a provision
of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 27.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement does not permit member states to exclude
any field of technology as a whole from patentability.69
However, the TRIPS Agreement does include certain
“flexibilities” such as Articles 27.2 and 30. Under
Article 30:
Members may provide limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that
such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of
the patent and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the
patent owner, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties.70
A member country could argue that clean technologies
are a limited exception, but this idea may be very
difficult to sell to a WTO dispute settlement panel.
This exception has primarily been used to allow for
academic research or experimental use by parties
other than a patent holder.71 A more narrowly-tailored
exception, such as an exception to a particular clean
technology sector, might have a better chance under
Article 30. An exclusion of clean technology patents
under Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement also
appears unlikely. It states:
Members
may
exclude
from
patentability
inventions,
the
prevention within their territory of
the commercial exploitation of which
Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Coop. Action Under the
Convention, Bonn F.R.G., June 1-12, 2009, Negotiating Text, pp.
184, U.N. doc. FCCC/AWGL/2009/8 (May 19, 2009), available
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca6/eng/inf01.pdf
[hereinafter Negotiating Text].
68. Id.
69. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 27.1
70. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 30.
71. See, e.g., Panel Report, Canada – Patent Protections of
Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
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is necessary to protect ordre public or
morality, including to protect human,
animal or plant life or health or to avoid
serious prejudice to the environment,
provided that such exclusion is not
made merely because the exploitation
is prohibited by their law.72
It would be contradictory to argue that protecting
health or avoiding serious prejudice to the environment
would be furthered by the prevention of commercial
exploitation of clean technologies, when clean
technologies would be implemented precisely to protect
health or avoid serious prejudice to the environment.
At least in theory, parties to both the
UNFCCC and the TRIPS Agreement could agree to
concurrently amend the TRIPS Agreement, or agree
not to enforce it in this regard, permiting abolishment
of IPRs in clean technology sectors, but the risk of
modifying the TRIPS Agreement should not be taken
lightly.73 Given the breadth of clean technology sectors,
the indefiniteness of what is encompassed by clean
technology, and the current divisiveness on the issue,
such a one-sided change seems far-fetched.74 Beyond
the express unwillingness of developed nations to
weaken patent protections, the lack of IPRs in the clean
technology sectors might discourage clean technology
transfer and impose a new barrier.
VIII. Compulsory Licensing75
Along with the ad hoc working group’s
proposed negotiating language, some nongovernmental organizations have advocated for
compulsory licensing.76 The recipient country would
issue a compulsory license by removing any royalty fees
that an IPR holder might desire to charge.77 Instead
of weakening IPRs across all clean technology sectors,
a single invention could be licensed on its individual
merits. Such a policy seeks to prevent anti-competitive
practices of IPR holders like hoarding.78 Compulsory
licensing is available under Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement79 and has been used in the past, such as in
72. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 27.2.
73. ICTSD Background Paper, supra note 13, at 7.
74. Abbott, supra note 57, at § 6(c).
75. A compulsory licensing is a license a government grants
to someone other than the patent owner to produce the patented
product or process without the consent of the patent owner.
76. EPO Report, supra note 25, at 14a.
77. ICTSD Background Paper, supra note 13, at 6.
78. UNCTAD Series on Issues in International
Investment Agreements, supra note 22, at 38.
79. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 31; ICTSDUNCTAD Capacity Building Project on IPRs and Sustainable
Development, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development: An
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the pharmaceutical context.80
However, the pharmaceutical sector is quite
different from clean technology sectors. A patented
pharmaceutical is likely to be the exclusive solution to
a particular need. Since there are usually no market
alternatives to a patented pharmaceutical, the IPRs
holder is able to charge large royalty fees. Developing
nations may not be able to afford the pharmaceutical,
even if the country is in great need of it.
Market competition in the area of clean
technologies also differs in several ways from
competition in the pharmaceuticals industry. First,
a study by John Barton demonstrates that a fair
amount of competition exists in the studied clean
technology sectors, keeping pricing to a minimum.81
This competition exists across multiple alternative
energy sectors.82 Also, many of the fundamental clean
technological solutions have long been off-patent.83
Second, though compulsory licensing
is permitted under the TRIPS Agreement, other
bilateral or multilateral agreements may restrict the
licensing of clean technologies, except in cases of
national emergency. Also, compulsory licensing could
potentially create an economic backlash.84 Therefore,
compulsory licensing may not be desirable for every
developing nation because of overarching consequences.
Finally, a license to a patented technology
does not necessarily equate to a transfer of technology.
Unlike a pharmaceutical patent, where disclosure of
a chemical formula may be sufficient to produce the
product, a clean technology patent may not disclose
enough information to actually commercialize the
technology.85 Trade secrets or technical know-how
might be required and would be beyond the disclosure
of the patent. In the pharmaceutical sector, a chemical
formula may be sufficient for a manufacturer in a
developing nation to produce a drug, and a compulsory
license might be sufficient knowledge to permit
manufacture. But in clean technology sectors, the
inventions may require more skill or knowledge to
authoritative and practical guide to the TRIPS Agreement, at
461, available at: http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/
ResourceBookIndex.htm (June 1, 2005) [hereinafter Book on
TRIPS].
80. William W. Fisher III & Dr. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Harvard
Law School, The South Africa AIDS Controversy A Case Study in
Patent Law and Policy 12-13 (2005), available at http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf.
81. Barton, supra note 60.
82. Id.
83. Id. The term “off-patent” refers to technologies which
have out-lived their patent terms.
84. Robert Fair, Does Climate Change Justify Compulsory
Licensing of Green Technology?, 6 B.Y.U. Int’l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 21,
25 (2009).
85. Srinivas, supra note 18, at 16-17, 27.
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produce.
For example, a solar photovoltaic (PV) cell
might be protected by multiple patents and trade
secrets. The particular compositions of the layers of
a p-n junction might be patented, but the method of
obtaining the desired precision engineering of those
layers might be a trade secret. Without the ability
to precisely produce those layers, the true efficiency
gain of the cell might never be realized. Therefore,
a compulsory license may be insufficient for actual
transfer of the clean technology, since it would
only disclose part of the technology.86 Additional
components, perhaps covered by other patents and
possibly owned by other companies, may be necessary
for implementation of the PV cell. A compulsory
license to one component of the PV cell may not
be useful without the other components. Finally, it
should be noted that developing countries present
other barriers that may be greater obstacles than IPRs.
Absence of a sufficient technological infrastructure, an
underdeveloped domestic industry and R&D base, or
poor access to production materials will undermine any
gains of the compulsory license.

If submission to a patent pool were
mandatory, disputes might arise over remuneration
because of the inherent difficulty of assessing what
might be “affordable,” or assessing the worth of
individual components of a device. For example, if the
manufacture of a solar panel involved multiple patents
with different assignees, would remuneration be split
equally among the assignees or split according to some
determined percentage of contribution?
Despite the problems associated with pooling
patents, packaging IP rights together with the knowhow to implement an invention may be necessary in
the LDCs and in emerging economies. A portion
of the negotiating text does address “associated trade
secrets and know-how on environmentally sound
technologies and enable them to be accessed.”90
Hence, the patent pooling provision actually has
an advantage over compulsory licensing in that it
is more closely linked to transfer of technology and
not just circumvention of IPRs. Also, developing
nations would gain a better sense of the total cost of
manufacture with a decreased risk of some unknown
element impeding commercialization.

IX. Patent Pools

X. A Proposed Solution

Another proposed technology transfer
mechanism involves patent pooling, the sharing of
clean technology at “affordable prices” or possibly
“royalty-free.”87 It is unclear from the Ad Hoc Working
Group negotiating text whether this sharing of clean
technology is voluntary or mandatory. If voluntary, it
may be similar to the current Eco-Patent Commons.88
The Eco-Patent Commons has made some in-roads into
sharing technology, but the only significant incentive
for a business to submit patents to the Commons is for
a business to improve how the public perceives it. This
incentive is not strong enough for inventors to share
their best or complete technological advances.89

The role of IPRs in the climate change
context is both complex and controversial. As
noted above, clean technologies encompass a wide
variety of technologies – each with unique market
conditions.91 While virtually all nations might agree
that climate change is a serious problem, the views of
individual nations on intellectual property and climate
change diverge.92 These divergent positions may be
irreconcilable if each country does not see an economic
benefit to compromise. The fear of global warming and
the recognition of an unsustainable energy policy may
not be compelling enough to evoke a change to the IP
system at the international level.

86. Additionally, PV cells supply direct current and require
converters to switch to an alternating current to use the electricity
from a home. Further, PV cells are dependent on direct sunlight
and must be coupled to batteries or allow for connection to a
traditional power grid during low light hours.
87. Negotiating Text, supra note 67.
88. The Eco-Patent Commons was launched by IBM, Nokia,
Pitney Bowes and Sony in partnership with the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and was founded
on the commitment that anyone who wants to bring environmental
benefits to market can use these patents to protect the environment
and enable collaboration between businesses that foster new
innovations. World Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD), http://www.wbcsd.org (last visited Aug.
10, 2011).
89. Cannady, supra note 34, at 11 (addressing the limits
of patent pools); But see Andrew Boynton, Eco-Patent Commons:
A Donation Approach Encouraging Innovation Within The Patent

A. Green Technology Packages
A successful mechanism to promote IP
in developing countries will require a multi-level
approach – technology packages and coordination on
an international level, as well as incentives and removal
of barriers at the national level. At the international
level, the idea of new Patent Commons by the Japan
Intellectual Property Association or “green technology
packages”93 by Honda show the kind of promise lacking
System, 35 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 659, 676 (2011).
90. Negotiating Text, supra note 67.
91. See infra Part V.
92. See infra Part IV.
93. A “package” would comprise sets of patents,
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from the earlier altruistic treaties bent on combating
climate change.94
A green technology package can gather
knowledge beyond the information contained in
a patent’s specification – knowledge which may be
necessary for true technology transfer. A patent
is granted to an inventor as an exclusive right, in
exchange for the inventor’s public disclosure of how
to make or use the invention. U.S. patent law requires
a written description of the invention sufficient
to teach one of ordinary skill in the art of how to
make or use the invention.95 In practice, this public
disclosure may not provide the necessary know-how
to efficiently commercialize the invention. The ability
to make a single product does not necessarily equate
to the ability manufacture a sufficient quantity to
be commercially viable. Also, a patent application
is written for “one of ordinary skill in the art.”96 So
those wishing to make or use the invention may need
to gain substantial knowledge in the field of endeavor.
Additionally, the patent examination process has no
physical means of determining whether the disclosure
is, in fact, adequate to make the invention 97 As a
result, there is no guarantee that even one of ordinary
skill in the art will have sufficient knowledge to make
or use the invention.98 Further, patent applications
can be drawn to individual components or aspects
of a product or process, and the law does not require
that all elements be disclosed so long as the claimed
invention is substantially useful.99 Instead of protecting
the entire invention under one patent, companies may
protect different aspects of an invention as trade secrets
or under separate patents. All this has the effect to
decoupling the knowledge disclosed by a patent and the
knowledge needed for transfer of technology.
As noted above with patent pools, green
technology packages have a distinct advantage
over compulsory licensing because they are able to
provide the knowledge necessary to commercialize an
invention. The green technology package can include
additional knowledge beyond the scope of a patent,
such as technical information, human resource plans,
and skills training. The green technology package can

group multiple patents together so that the potential
licensee does not need to negotiate separate licenses.
For example, a PV cell, converter, and battery might be
grouped together under this green technology package.
This grouping would alleviate the difficulty of shopping
for each component, which may be a significant
undertaking if the potential licensee is unfamiliar with
the technology. Also, the potential licensee would be
able to project a more accurate business model, since
the package provides a one-stop shop.
Another advantage of green technology
packages is that pricing can be easily compared to
among packages. Newly patented technologies must
still compete with older, off-patent technologies. A
green technology package allows flexible pricing to
adjust to the demand and position of each technology
area. Wind, PV, and biofuel all have a small number
of market members, but high levels of competition.
Analysis shows that strong competition among wind,
PV, and biofuel manufacturers has kept licensing prices
down.100 For example, a Chinese firm, Goldwind,
licensed wind technology from a German firm for
a 1% royalty.101 Presumably a green technology
package would also be competitively priced to attract
developing nations.102
Based on an EPO licensing survey, there is
little overall out-licensing to developing countries
in clean technology sectors, which is on par with
other industries.103 This suggests that current clean
technology transfer mechanisms have failed to
appreciably promote out-licensing. One possible
reason for the under-licensing is the failure of
licensors to communicate with potential licensees.
Based on the submissions by developing countries
of their technology needs assessments (TNAs) to
the Global Environment Facility (GEF), developing
countries may not be aware of the technical solutions
available throughout the world.104 The EPO has
added a new classification scheme to enhance global
awareness of patented and non-patented solutions in
clean technology sectors.105 But perhaps there is an
opportunity to match the needs of developing countries
(identified by the TNAs) and the actual patent owners
– or better yet green technology package owners.

documentation, and other IP and non-IP knowledge gathered
together to facilitate commercialization.
94. Cannady, supra note 34, at 19.
95. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
96. Id.
97. For over a century the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
has not required a working model an invention to grant a patent.
98. Srinivas, supra note 18, at 26. However, a patent may be
invalidated by a U.S. federal court on the grounds practicing the
invention requires knowledge beyond the level of one of ordinary
skill in the art.
99. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).

100. Barton, supra note 60, at 4.
101. Id. (Wind, having the lowest competition of the three
sectors, would normally have the highest royalties).
102. Developing countries may also be able to draw from
public funds.
103. EPO Report, supra note 25, at 64.
104. Handbook for Conducting Technology Needs
Assessment for Climate Change 20, 21 (Sarwat Chowdhury et al.
eds., 2010) (directing countries implementing a technology needs
assessment to ClimateTechWiki designed to inform them about
different technology options).
105. EPO Report, supra note 25, at 65.
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A recent draft by the Expert Group on
Technology Transfer concerning the Technology
Mechanism of the Copenhagen Accord envisions
a Climate Technology Centre (CTC) that would
function as network hub and facilitator, technical
advisor and consultant, matchmaker, catalyst, broker,
and technology accelerator.106 A body such as the CTC
might be used to link a demand in developing nations
for a particular clean technology to a provider of such
technology, bridging the gap between the two entities.
Such a body would be in a position to alleviate legal
issues in licensing by pre-negotiating and funding
issues through the UNFCCC’s financial mechanisms.
The CTC would be in a unique position to not only
determine suitable matches for technology transfer
but also to drive innovation by informing technology
developers of the needs of potential developing country
customers.
B. National Incentives
But even if a technology is available for
license, complete with know-how and a business
model matched to a developing country, that country
may lack the infrastructure or economic disposition
necessary for implementation. For example, a wind
turbine design might be licensed with all the knowledge
necessary for manufacturing the turbine, but if the
developing country’s local power grid cannot handle
the fluctuation in energy production inherent to the
fluctuation of the winds themselves, the technology
may be worthless. Similarly, national subsidies for
fossil fuels may provide an insurmountable barrier to
a moderately priced solar field. Therefore, a national
level of transfer mechanisms will be required to
counteract such internal barriers.
Research companies in developed countries
need to coordinate with their governments in order
to spur sufficient competition and keep pricing low
for green technology packages. Since most clean
technology research is publicly funded, submission of
a green technology package for each commercialized
clean technology could be a requirement to receive
public funds. At the very least, countries like the
United States may have to modify existing laws
such as the Bayh-Dole Act, which favors licensing
to firms that manufacture primarily in the United
106. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Preparing for the Implementation of the Proposed Technology
Mechanism (Expert Group on Technology Transfer, Working
Paper EGTT/2010/13, Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://unfccc.
int/ttclear/jsp/EGTTDoc/EGTT_Modalities_draft_working_
paper_4%20November.pdf. See United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Subsidiary Body for Scientific &
Technological Advice, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2002/L.9 (June
12, 2002) (establishing the Expert Group on Technology Transfer).

States.107 An exception in the Bayh-Dole Act for
clean technologies will benefit clean technology
patent owners in the United States by permitting outsourced labor and production to reduce the overall
cost of commercialization of a technology. Given
current U.S. unemployment rates, it will be politically
unpopular to suggest that manufacturing jobs of clean
technologies should be moved to a developing country.
But developed nations like the United States would
be better served focusing on jobs creation in the areas
of clean technology research and development, rather
than manufacturing. The United States’ advantage
over many other nations lies in the exportation of
intellectual property knowledge, not exportation of
manufactured goods.
Incentives have been successfully used in
the past to spark innovation in underdeveloped
technologies, or to give a competitive advantage to
areas already developed. Ethanol subsidies in the
U.S., and petroleum subsidies in Venezuela and
Russia, are examples of ways to reduce pricing in a
particular technological area. Prizes, like the X Prize
for space flight, can inspire and mobilize technology
innovators.108 Public funds and grants for research and
development such as the California Public Utilities
Commission Solar Initiative and Sustainable Energy
USA awards can help grow a technology sector.109
Developing nations can implement similar incentives to
help growth in the clean technology sectors.
In addition to incentives to develop
endogenous technology, developing nations should use
national incentives to encourage investment in clean
technology transfer. Both positive incentives, such
as prizes or subsidies, and negative incentives, such
as carbon taxes, can tip the balance in favor of clean
technologies. Without such monetary incentives, the
gap with fossil fuels in competitive pricing will only be
reduced by innovation. This will lead to long delays
in the adoption of clean technologies on a large scale,
while further harm is done to the environment. If a
successful exchange of technology can take place, the
benefits can simulate the advantages of foreign direct
investment: a developing country gains improved clean
technology sectors and the knowledge and skills for
their own future development. In the long term, the
level of competition and global market demand will
increase and the developing nation can use the global
IP system to strengthen its own economy.
Incentives can also be linked to the green
technology packages. An incentive would help
107. See Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Laws Amendment
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
108. Kammen, supra note 11, at 343 (calling for a sustainable
energy award in the U.S.).
109. Id.
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subsidize the purchase of a green technology package by
a developing nation or work cooperatively to provide
any necessary infrastructure improvements. For
example, a guaranteed update to a developing nation’s
local power grid might be offered to a firm licensing the
technology to build a wind or solar field. Developed
nations could also make public funds contingent on the
formation of green technology packages. Hence, if a
firm receives research dollars from the government and
that research leads to patenting and commercialization,
the firm could be required to offer a green technology
package at a competitive price. If a developing nation
desires a green technology package, the IP rights holder
would still receive a royalty on the license and a public
image boost for the spread of green technology.
One problem with incentives is the balance
of technologies. Since incentives are designed to
disturb the natural balance, care should be used
in deciding which clean technologies will receive
benefits. Developing nations should choose only the
most efficient green technology package based on the
nation’s local constraints. A loss of efficiency results
in waste and misplaced incentives to green technology
package providers. Appropriate time limitations on
subsidies would also help to ensure that the choice of
technologies is flexible and to prevent dependence on a
single technology.
Another issue to consider is the role of IP
in light of green technology packages and national
incentives. The stability and strength of an IP legal
system could affect the relative pricing of a developing
nation consumer. Some nations may appear riskier
than others based on weak IP enforcement or
unfavorable national IP laws. China, for example, has a
reputation of being a risky country to invest in because
of favoritism towards its citizens.110 In China, unlike
many other countries, the licensor may have no rights
to any improvements made by a licensee.111 A green
technology package to China may be more expensive as
a result of this favoritism. This may, in turn, encourage
China to establish a more balanced IP system for
foreigners.

international community should direct efforts toward
reducing the barriers that impede these transactions
and work to develop a strong clean technology market.
Groups like the CTC can help identify potential
developing nation consumers and pair them with clean
technology providers. Governments can limit domestic
barriers that impede transfer of clean technologies
and incentivize development of clean technologies.
Though economic conditions or political pressures may
galvanize a united movement toward alternative energy
solutions, appeals to nations through profit may be
more effective than an appeal to a sense of the public
welfare. Green technology packages and corresponding
incentives can appeal to both and, therefore, make
promising mechanisms for promoting environmentally
sound technologies in the developing world.

XI. Conclusion
The most significant aspect of green technology
packages is the quid pro quo – climate change
adaptation and mitigation technologies in exchange
for potential profits for IPR holders and innovators.
The global IP regime can be used as a resource in
gathering information and facilitating licensing. The
110. See Mei Gechlik, Making Transfer of Clean Technology
Work: Lessons of the Clean Development Mechanism, 11 San Diego
Int’l L.J. 227, 263 (2009).
111. Copenhagen Economics, supra note 48, at §4.1.28.
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